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Learning from Latin America’s Experience: 
Europe’s Failure in the “Lisbon Process”
* 
 
The current paper investigates the cross-national relevance of Latin American “dependencia 
theory” for five dimensions of development (democracy and human rights, environment, 
human development and basic human needs satisfaction, gender justice, redistribution, 
growth and employment) on a global scale. It tries to confront the very basic pro-globalist 
assumptions of the “Lisbon process”, the policy target of the European leaders since the EU’s 
Lisbon Council meeting in March 2000 to make Europe the leading knowledge-based 
economy in the world with a “Latin American perspective”. A realistic and politically useful 
analysis of the “Lisbon process” has to be a “Schumpeterian” approach. First, we analyze the 
“Lisbon performance” of the world economy by multivariate, quantitative means, looking into 
the possible contradictions that might exists between the dependent insertion into the global 
economy and other goals of the “Lisbon process”. Dependency from the large, transnational 
corporations, as correctly predicted by Latin American social science of the 1960s and 
1970s, emerges as one of the most serious development blockades, confronting Europe. 
Secondly, we analyze European regional performance since the 1990s in order to know 
whether growth and development in Europe spread evenly among the different regions of the 
continent. It emerges that dependency from the large transnational corporations is 
incompatible with a balanced, regional development. Finally, we discuss cross-national and 
historical lessons learned from the views of dependency and Schumpeterian perspectives for 
current policy-making in Europe, and opt for an industrial policy approach in the tradition of 
former EU-Commission President (1985-1995) Jacques Delors. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J01, O52, O54, P50 
  





Arno Tausch  
Department of Political Science 
Innsbruck University 
Universitätsstraße 15 
2. Stock West 
A-6020 Innsbruck 
Austria 
E-mail: Arno.Tausch@uibk.ac.at   
 
                                                 
* Opinions expressed by Dr. Tausch in this contribution are exclusively those expressed in his capacity 
as adjunct professor at Austrian Universities and do not or do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 
the Austrian government. 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Profound economic crises, like the current one, as the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the “oil crisis” of the 1970s, seem to be an appropriate time for reconsidering some 
basic principles of economics and the upswing of “dependency theory”. From a 
European perspective, especially in an enlarged European Union, now comprising 27 
countries, many of them with a typical profile of what classic Latin American social 
science would call a “semi-periphery”, the basic question must be asked as to whether 
the dependent insertion into the global economy is still a general receipt for a sound 
and successful development? Or is there a lesson to be learnt from the experience of the 
world periphery and semi-periphery, and from classic Latin American dependency 
research, which was generally critical about the long-term polarizing social effects of 
relations of dependency? In a recent EU-Presidency country non-paper by the Swedish 
government, written in 2009, we read: 
“Trade and economic integration, combined with new technology, bring new markets, 
competitors and trade partners closer. They help to decrease poverty, promote 
democratic values and increase international stability. They bring enormous 
opportunities but also tougher global competition and make increased demands on 
European markets, companies and individuals to adapt to change. This holds true even 
more so today when facing global financial and economic unrest. Therefore, we need to 
take further action to reap the benefits from globalisation by strengthening Europe’s 
competitiveness.” (Eco-efficient Growth in the Age of Globalisation. Swedish non-
paper on the Lisbon strategy post-2010, Stockholm, 2009) 
This paper will confront the basic underlying assumptions of this European political 
economic strategy with a “Latin American perspective” and will perform one of the 
largest ever overall cross-national tests of the effects of dependency, culture, 
geography, recent world economic history and pension reforms on five dimensions of 
development (what we call here the “global Lisbon process”, consisting of the five 
dimensions: democracy and human rights, environment, human development and basic 
human needs satisfaction, gender justice, redistribution, growth and employment). 
What lessons are then to be drawn for the basic assumptions of the “Lisbon process”, 
the policy target of the European leaders since the EU’s Lisbon Council meeting in 
March 2000 to make Europe the leading knowledge-based economy? 
With each enlargement wave, Europe becomes more and more comparable to the more 
advanced countries of Latin America, by first integrating the semi-periphery Ireland 
(1973), then Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s and now the new member 
countries of the “big bang enlargement” of 2004. Very early on, the Norwegian social 
scientist Johan Galtung not only discovered for the “global North” the foundations of 
dependency theory with his famous 1971 essay, but in 1982 he portrayed the European 
Union as nothing else but a powerhouse of transnational corporation interventionism. 
To our knowledge, Seers and associates were the first to introduce with their 1978 
study the notion of an “underdeveloped Europe”. European policy making, by and 
large, today pretends that a free-for all opening of the markets is a good solution, 
everywhere and anytime. At the recent elections to the European Parliament, political 
parties, which oppose heavily these current EU-Commission policies from the right and 
left, and which do not belong to the mainstream center-right or center left 
parliamentary caucuses in the European Parliament (EPP-ED (European People’s 3 
 
Party), PES (Social Democrats), ALDE (Liberals), Greens – EFA) see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2009/default.htm?language=EN) gained more 
than 30 % of the popular vote in the following 12 of the 27 EU member countries 
(ordered in descending percentage points of the political weights of such more radical 
parties which question the basic European consensus): Latvia, Lithuania, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, UK, Austria, Cyprus, Netherlands, Italy, Poland, France and 
Portugal. 
Globalization critics, like the platform “Attac” undoubtedly play an ever larger role in 
the politics of several European Union countries and were instrumental in defeating the 
government in the French referendum on the European Constitution in 2005.  
As it is well known, in March 2000, the EU Heads of States and Governments agreed 
to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 
2010.” Although some progress was made on innovating Europe's economy, there is a 
consensus that the reform process was not going fast enough and that the ambitious 
targets were not reached a decade later, as foreseen at the March 2000 Lisbon Council
2. 
As it is also widely known, the 14 main structural “Lisbon” agenda indicators, created 
to measure progress in meeting the Lisbon targets, play an important role in European 
policy making
3. The Lisbon lists of indicators, apart from the highly publicized debt-
related Maastricht criteria of the European Monetary Union, are perhaps the most 
important checklists for government success or failure in Europe today. They are omni-
present in the public political as well as scientific debate and are defined by Eurostat as: 
List of Lisbon indicators:
4 
1.  GDP per capita in PPS (to be maximized) 
2.  Labor productivity (to be maximized) 
3.  Employment rate (to be maximized) 
4.  Employment rate of older workers (to be maximized) 
5.  Educational attainment (20-24) (to be maximized) 
6.  Research and Development expenditure (to be maximized) 
7.  Comparative “price levels”
5 (to be minimized) 
8.  Business investment (to be maximized) 
9.  At risk-of-poverty rate (to be minimized) 
10. Long-term unemployment rate (to be minimized) 
11. Dispersion of regional employment rates (to be minimized) 
12. Greenhouse gas emissions (to be minimized) 
13. Energy intensity of the economy (to be minimized) 
14. Volume of freight transport (to be minimized) 
                                             
2 Available freely on the Internet at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 




4 The Commission maintaining that a low value of indicators 7 and 9-14 is a good result. 
5 For a neo-classical critique of this concept see also Yotopoulos, 1996, and Yotopoulos and Sawada, 
2005. From the viewpoint of neo-dependency theory see Kohler/Tausch, 2003. It is interesting how little 
debate on this politically binding concept exists in Europe. 4 
 
The Commission (2005) classified the Lisbon reforms into five categories: 
1.  Product and capital market reforms; 
2.  Investments in the knowledge-based economy; 
3.  Labor market reforms; 
4.  Social policy reforms; 
5.  Environmental policy reforms. 
The current paper will now confront the underlying, pro-globalist logic of the Lisbon 
strategy with what we perceive as the essence of the classical “Latin American” 
structuralist and dependencia argument, developed in the late 1960s, i.e. four decades 
ago, in a long-term structural analysis of the preconditions of successful social, 
economic and environmental development, thus confronting the very basic assumptions 
of the “Lisbon process” with such a “Latin American perspective”. Especially we will 
analyze, whether the dependent insertion into the global economy, operationalized by:  
    Foreign saving [(I-S)/GNP], 
    Low comparative international price level [ERD], and 
  Transnational capital penetration [MNC PEN 1995] 
will offer better explanations of the five main dimensions of global development 
(democracy and human rights, environment, human development and basic human 
needs satisfaction, gender justice, redistribution, growth and employment) than 
standard predictors of global development performance, like:   
•  State interventionism (absence of economic freedom) 
•  Percentage of the population adhering to the Muslim faith 
•  Membership in the European Union before the Eastern enlargement of 2004 
•  Dummy for being landlocked 
•  Urbanization ratio 
•  Dummy for transition economy 
•  Development level [ln(GDP PPP pc) and its square [ln(GDP PPP pc)]
2 
•  World Bank pension reform 
So, firstly we analyze the “Lisbon performance” of the world economy by multivariate, 
quantitative means, looking into the possible contradictions that might exists between 
dependent insertion into the global economy and the goals of the “Lisbon process”. 
Secondly, we analyze in this paper also European regional performance since the 1990s 
in order to know whether growth and development in Europe spread evenly among the 
different regions of the continent. Regional development reveals important implications 
for the overall development process, as has been demonstrated recently by Heshmati 
(2007) in an analysis about the trajectory of regional inequality in 10 countries (China, 
Colombia, India, Indonesian Java, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, USA, and 
Zambia).  
Again, it emerges that dependency from the large transnational corporations is 
incompatible with a balanced, regional development. Finally, we discuss lessons 
learned from the views of dependency and Schumpeterian perspectives for current 
policy-making in Europe.  
At the time, Osvaldo Sunkel put the worldview of Latin American social science into 
prisma and correctly foresaw the current development crisis of the European continent: 5 
 
‘The interpretation so far advanced suggests that the international capitalist system 
contains an internationalized nucleus of activities, regions and social groups of varying 
degrees of importance in each country. These sectors share a common culture and 
‘way of life’, which expresses itself through the same books, texts, films, television 
programs, similar fashions, similar groups of organization of family and social life, 
similar style of decoration of homes, similar orientations to housing, building, furniture 
and urban design. Despite linguistic barriers, these sectors have a far greater capacity 
for communication among themselves than is possible between integrated and marginal 
persons of the same country who speak the same language (...) Modernization implies 
the gradual replacement of the traditional productive structure by another of much 
higher capital intensiveness (...) On the one hand, the process of modernization 
incorporates into the new structures the individuals and groups that are apt to fit into 
the kind of rationality that prevails there; on the other hand, it expels the individuals 
and groups that have no place in the new productive structure or who lack the capacity 
to become adapted to it. It is important to emphasize that this process does not only 
prevent or limit the formation of a national entrepreneurial class, as indicated by 
Furtado, but also of a national middle class (...) and even a national working class. The 
advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area dividing 
the integrated from the segregated segments (...) In this process, some national 
entrepreneurs are incorporated as executives into the new enterprises or those 
absorbed by the TRANCO (i.e. transnational corporations), and others are 
marginalized; some professionals, forming part of the technical staff and the segment 
of employees are incorporated, and the rest are marginalized; part of the qualified 
labor supply and those that are considered fit to be upgraded are incorporated, while 
the remainder are marginalized. 
The effect of the disintegration of each social class has important consequences for 
social mobility. The marginalized entrepreneur will probably add to the ranks of small 
or artesanal manufacture, or will abandon independent activity and become a middle 
class employee. The marginalized sectors of the middle class will probably form a 
group of frustrated lower middle class people trying to maintain middle class 
appearance without much possibility of upward mobility and terrorized by the danger 
of proletarization. The marginalized workers will surely add to the ranks of absolute 
marginality, where, as in the lower middle class, growing pools of resentment and 
frustration of considerable demographic dimension will accumulate (...) Finally, it is 
very probable that an international mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, 
particularly between the internationalized sectors (...) The process of social 
disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social institutions 
which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express 
themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, 
therefore, probably also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political 
parties with a relatively wide popular base, the universities etc.’ (Sunkel, 1973: 18-42).  
Does such an analysis apply for the EU-27 and the global economy in 2009? Five years 
after European Union accession and two decades after the transformation process in the 
East of the continent had begun it is time to take a more systematic and global view on 
what has been achieved since 1989, and what problems might be ahead in East Central 
Europe and in the EU-27 as a whole.  6 
 
That such a perspective is permitted, or even recommended in the scientific debate 
about the region and about the EU-27 is far from clear. Kornai, not too distantly ago, 
pointed out that mainstream economics relinquishes the profound criticism of the 
capitalist economy to “those professing radical views” (Kornai, 2005, final Chapter, 
Presidential address, International Economic Association). Kornai went on to say that 
even when the economic profession accepts the fact that there may be problems, it lulls 
itself into believing that these problems can be reassuringly resolved by applying 
appropriate measures. It denies, Kornai says, that the system may have inborn, 
insurmountable genetic defects. Compared to the rapid political and human rights 
transformation, which the region experienced, and which Kornai continues to call an 
“unparalleled success”, all achieved in a climate of democracy and non-violence, one is 
at least permitted to speak about the negative sides as well – not in the form of a 
balance sheet, but as an agenda for future policy and research. 
For Kornai, some of these main contradictions are: 
1.  The real income of a significant proportion of the population has remained 
unchanged, or even deteriorated 
2.  “A dramatic restructuring”, which has taken place in the area of income 
distribution 
3.  The employment rate has significantly declined and open unemployment has 
appeared, and job security disappeared 
4.  Public security was deteriorating 
5.  Corruption 
6.  Disorders in the political arena 
7.  “It can be stated with certainty that capitalism gives birth to disparity. But tax 
policies favoring the rich while afflicting the impoverished, or poorly 
distributed state subsidies, can make matters even worse.” (Kornai, 2005) 
Applications of “dependency thinking” to the realities of East Central Europe were 
attempted, among others, by Batou and Szlajfer (2009), Bernhard and Szlajfer (1995), 
Foster and Szlajfer (1984) and Szlajfer (1990). But also in Western Europe, and not 
only in the “old Europe”, such a perspective is necessary. Dissatisfaction with the 
“Lisbon process” of the European Union is widespread, relevant optimistic recent 
voices from the Commission notwithstanding.
6 As shown in Graph 1, in terms of real 
purchasing power, Europe by far lags behind the US, its main Lisbon process 
competitor. 
Insert Graph 1 Real purchasing power about here 
The message of this graph is clear – the US, Norway and Switzerland are still ahead of 
the EU-27, the EU-15 and the Euro zone; and Japan declined from 1996 to 2008, while 
the non-EU-27-members Norway and – since 2005 also Switzerland – are on a 
trajectory overtaking the EU-27. Instead of surging ahead, the core regions of Western 
Europe relatively stagnated since the beginning of the Lisbon process in 2000. 
Authors like Joseph Alois Schumpeter, and later world system and dependency writers 
like Samir Amin, Volker Bornschier, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Raul Prebisch, and 
                                             
6 For a survey of the literature on the Lisbon strategy and its evaluation see: European Commission 
(2003, 2005), European Commission Report (2005), and Eur-Lex (2005).  7 
 
Osvaldo Sunkel, were always aware of the crises, cyclical imbalances, regional shifts, 
and of the rise and decline of entire regions and even continents in the process of 
capitalist development. We return in a way to the “old Galicia” of 1909 to 1911, where 
Schumpeter gained valuable insights into the nature of world development as a young 
University professor. Schumpeter could well observe in Czernowitz (then a German-
language university on the very eastern outer rim of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, now 
Chernivtsi University in Northern Bukovina, Ukraine) at first hand this “creative 
destruction”, which capitalism constituted in the Galician periphery of the Empire. 
Several of his major works, like “The Nature and Essence of Theoretical Economics” 
(1908, translated 2009) “The Theory of Economic Development: An inquiry into profits, 
capital, credit, interest and the business cycle” (1912, first translated 1934) were all 
heavily influenced by his early experiences at the outer rim, and not by the experience 
of the “center”. 
Like many other development theorists of the first generation of development 
economists after the Second World War, whose stars began to rise long after 
Schumpeter already went to America, Kurt Mandelbaum, Paul Narcyz Rosenstein-
Rodan, and Hans Wolfgang Singer, all shared with Schumpeter the observation that 
capitalism never was a smooth equilibrium process. Mandelbaum, Rosenstein-Rodan 
and Singer, and the dependency theorists in Latin America, whom they so heavily 
influenced, were deeply convinced that capitalism is NOT crisis-free growth, full 
employment, environmental sustainability and the end to social exclusion.
7 
At the end of the day, a realistic and politically useful analysis of the “Lisbon process” 
has to be “Schumpeterian” in its question writing – not excluding the contradictions 
inherent in the process of capitalist development, which we witness since the year 1989 
at the pan-European level.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 the main theories under 
scrutiny are outlined. Section 3 presents the data and research design. Computation of 
the dimension index used for evaluation of the Global Lisbon Process is outlined in 
Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5 and further discussed in section 6. The 
final section summarizes and concludes this study. 
 
2. The main theories under scrutiny here 
European Union policy making nowadays makes basic pro-globalist assumptions, like 
the one that a low comparative international price level is absolutely necessary for 
socio-economic development. Comparative price levels depend on the relationship 
between tradables and non-tradables. Countries with low price levels in non-tradables 
generally have low comparative price levels. But does a haircut in France really have to 
be as inexpensive as in Bangladesh for the Lisbon process in Europe to be successful? 
For dependency and later world systems theory, going back to its four “founding 
fathers” Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel 
                                             
7 For a selection of such studies see: Mandelbaum (1945), and Rosenstein-Rodan (1964) 8 
 
Wallerstein, ascent and decline in world society is largely being determined in our age 
by the following ‘five monopolies’:
8 
•  The monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures of the 
dominant nations, 
•  The monopoly of control over global finances and a strong position in the 
hierarchy of current account balances, 
•  The monopoly of access to natural resources, 
•  The monopoly over international communication and the media, and 
•  The monopoly of the military means of mass destruction. 
Dependency authors in the traditions of Cardoso (1977), Furtado (1976), and Sunkel 
(1966, 1978, 1994 and 2003, for the later, European reception of dependency thought 
see also Murshed, 2002; Murshed and Raffer, 1993; Raffer, 1987; Raffer and Singer, 
1996, 2001; Tausch and Ghymers, 2007; Tausch and Prager, 1993) generally explained 
backwardness and stagnation by the ever-growing dependent insertion of these 
countries into the world economy. Starting with the writings of Prebisch (1983, 1988) 
and Rothschild (1944), their leading spokespersons all would stress the unequal and 
socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on 
investment from the highly developed countries, even in the richer countries of the 
European Union. Short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will 
be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account 
balances.  
Later world system analyses – that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian 
socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War - tended to confirm and expand this 
dependency argument. Capitalism in the periphery, like in the center, is characterized 
by strong cyclical fluctuations, and there are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. 
The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but 
the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal transfer tends to remain 
stable.  
Dependency and world system theory has a disturbing message for the European 
integration process even today, some four decades after the first analyses by Cardoso, 
Furtado, Sunkel and many others were written in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Their 
perspective would generally hold that poverty and backwardness in semi-periphery 
countries like the new member states of the European Union, which joined the “club” 
in May 2004, are caused by the peripheral or quasi-peripheral position that these 
nations or regions have in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist 
world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and 
the nations of the periphery. Fernando Henrique Cardoso once, at the height of the 
debate, summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows: 
•  There is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist 
centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery, 
•  This produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral 
societies and between them and the centers, 
•  This leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery, 
                                             
8 See Amin (1976), Arrighi (1995), Frank (1983, 1990 and 1998) and Wallerstein (2000). 9 
 
•  This favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations, and 
•  These require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the 
functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which 
contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance 
(Cardoso, 1979). 
It is now very tempting to look at the European realities with, so to speak, Latin 
American eyes. Our geographical presentation of our own variables used in the analysis 
will be kept to a minimum. Among the dependent variables, we just mention MNC 
penetration, unequal transfer and the resource balance as the three “master variables” of 
dependency. Unequal transfer is strongest in the periphery, and weakest in the centers, 
with the semi-periphery showing medium levels of exposure to unequal transfer (see 
Map 1.A and 1.B). Our map might be even termed to be an update of this 
Wallersteinean concept to the realities of the turn of the last Century and Millennium, 
with the centers having values that correspond to the zones of lighter color, the semi-
peripheries in grey colors, and the peripheries in dark colors. 
Insert Map 1.A Comparative price levels, World, about here 
Insert Map 1.B Comparative price levels, Europe, about here 
In general terms, we observe today high levels of MNC penetration in the “dominion 
economies” like Australia and Canada, in Western Europe, in some parts of Eastern 
Europe, in Central Asia, other parts of the former USSR, in many parts of Latin 
America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in Tunisia, and in China and 
Southeast Asia (see Map 2.A to 2.D). 
Insert Map 2.A MNC penetration, World, about here 
Insert Map 2.B MNC penetration, Europe, about here 
Insert Map 2.C Increase in MNC, World, about here 
Insert Map 2.D Increase in MNC, Eueope, about here 
MNC penetration received a vast attention in the published titles of the comparative 
research literature of the last three decades, above all in the writings of the Swiss 
sociologist Volker Bornschier (2002) and his associates (1977, 1979 and 1985). While 
different authors disagree on the direction of the influence of MNC penetration on the 
human condition, they all underline the strong influence of MNC penetration on 
employment, economic growth, income distribution and overall development. 
Foreign saving, for its turn, is strongest in many parts of Latin America, Southern 
Africa, in the “new Europe” and in China and in several countries of Southeast Asia 
(see Map 3.A and 3.B). In the classical dependency-oriented literature, it has been dealt 
with extensively, among others, in the works of Paul Israel Singer. 
Insert Map 3.A Foreign saving, World, about here 
Insert Map 3.B Foreign saving, Europe, about here 
 
3. Data and developing the research design 
It seems to be important at this point to emphasize that our three indicators of 
dependency measure three different types of “dependent development”:  10 
 
•  MNC penetration measures the different degrees of weight that foreign capital 
investments have in the host countries, i.e. the UNCTAD percentages of the 
stocks of multinational corporation investments per total host country GDP. 
This research tradition has been especially developed by the Swiss sociologist 
Volker Bornschier and his school. 
•  What current European policy-making calls “low comparative price levels” but 
what dependency theories call “unequal exchange/unequal transfer” 
(Kohler/Tausch, 2003, furthermore Raffer, 1987, Yotopoulos, 1996, and 
Yotopoulos/Sawada, 2005) is operationalized here simply by ERD or ERDI, the 
exchange rate deviation index, which measures the degree, to which 
globalization has contributed to lowering the international price level of a 
country; i.e. it is an indicator about the openness of the price system vis-à-vis 
the pressures of dependent insertion into the global economy. The result of this 
is an unequal transfer from the peripheries to the centers, which used to be high-
price countries until very recently. ERD is calculated by the ratio between GDP 
at purchasing power parities, divided by GDP at current exchange rates. 
•  For dependency authors, foreign savings show the weight that foreign savings, 
mostly from the centers and richer semi-peripheries, have in the accumulation 
process of the host countries in the periphery and semi-periphery. It is 
calculated by the difference between the share of investments per GDP and the 
share of savings per GDP.  
The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (134 countries
9) was 
determined by the availability of a complete data series for these independent variables 
(if not mentioned otherwise, UNDP data). The data for this study were described and 
presented in great detail in the analysis Tausch, 2008, so our description will be kept to 
a minimum here
10. 
                                             
9 Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; 
Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; 
Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo; Congo, Dem. Rep. of the; Costa 
Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; 
Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. 
of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep. of; Kyrgyzstan; Lao 
People's Dem. Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; 
Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; 
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; 
Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; 
Senegal; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania, U. Rep. of; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and 
Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; 
Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
10 The results in Tausch (2008) are based on Microsoft EXCEL multiple regressions. The SPSS XV 
regressions reported in the present study are a continuation and refinement of the earlier research results, 
reported in Tausch, 2008. On the reliability problems of common statistical software programs, like 
Microsoft EXCEL, especially when collinearity of the predictor variables is higher (as is the case in the 
present regression equations), see Altman and McDonald (2001). Our tests revealed the basic validity of 
the argument, put forward by Altman and McDonald, which has vast and serious implications for the 
entire social science profession. SPSS and Microsoft EXCEL regressions reveal, our tests showed, the 11 
 
So, in this study we utilize data from 134 countries. For each we have information 
about 12 independent variables which are grouped into six dimensions. The number of 
dependent variables is 17, divided into five dimensions. These indicators of 
development are jointly used to construct a multidimensional Global Lisbon Process 
index. The aim is to shed lights on the development in EU and characterize it by three 
types of dependency.  
The design of our study is based on usual, SPSS XV ordinary least square standard 
regression of the “kitchen sink type” (Durlauf et al., 2008) of economic growth and 
economic performance in the research tradition of Barro, 2003. The independent 
variables of our model for around the year 2000 or later comprised the following list. 
As we said, we used this list to construct a single “global Lisbon process” indicator. 
The independent variables include: 
1.  Development level ln (GDP PPP pc). This variable should control for the effects 
of rising incomes on development (UNDP HDR, 2000) 
2.  Development level, square (maturity effects) ln (GDP PPP pc)
2. This variable 
should control for the effects of economic maturity on development (UNDP 
HDR, 2000) 
3.  Dummy: landlocked country (Easterly, 2000) 
4.  Dummy: transition country (Easterly, 2000) 
5.  EU-15-membership (EU member by the year 2000, dummy variable) 
6.  Foreign saving (I-S)/GNP (calculated from UNDP 2000) 
7.  MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD World Investment Report, current issues) 
8.  Percentage of Muslims per total population (Nationmaster
11) 
9.  State interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and 
Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom
12, by around 2000) 
10. Unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: ERDI, reciprocal value of 
comparative “price levels”, developed on the basis of the ERD-Index 
Yotopoulos et al., the Commission maintaining that a low value is good result; 
data source UNDP HDR, 2000) 
11. Urbanisation (Easterly 2000) 
12. World Bank pension reform
13 (World Bank sources, quoted in Tausch (2007) 
The independent variables listed above correspond to the following dimensions: 
                                                                                                                                   
same R
2, regression constants, and overall F-tests, but the significance of the predictors changes in 
Microsoft EXCEL regressions is not stable, depending on the ordering of the independent variables, 
while SPSS results are stable, regardless of the ordering of the independent variables. 
11 See nationmaster.com at: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/rel_isl_per_mus-religion-islam-
percentage-muslim 
12 These data are contained in http://www.freetheworld.com/; also: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/. We used the latter website as the source of our data. It 
has to be kept in mind that the “worst” countries on the economic freedom scale have the numerically 
highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao People's Dem. Rep. – 
the economically “unfreest” country in our sample, has the numerical value 4.6, while the economically 
freest country, Singapore, scores 1.45. We thus decided to call our indicator “state interventionism”. 
13 Argentina; Australia; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Croatia; Denmark; El Salvador; Hungary; Kazakhstan; 
Mexico; Netherlands; Peru; Poland; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; Uruguay. 12 
 
1.  Dependent insertion into the global economy 
  Foreign saving [(I-S)/GNP] 
  Low comparative international price level [ERD] 
  State interventionism (absence of economic. freedom) 
  Transnational capital penetration [MNC PEN 1995] 
2.  Percentage of the population adhering to the Muslim faith 
3.  Membership in the European Union before the Eastern enlargement of 2004 
4.  Geography 
  Dummy for being landlocked 
  Urbanization ratio, 1990 
5.  Recent world economic history 
  Dummy for transition economy 
  Development level [ln (GDP PPP pc) and its square [ln (GDP PPP pc)]
 2 
6.  Pension Reform efforts 
  World Bank pension reform 
The dependent variables for this analysis correspond to standard knowledge in 
comparative political science and sociology. They were all standardized, as we will 
explain below, on a scale ranging from 1 (best value) to 0 (worst performance); with 
the indicators, whose high numerical values imply a bad development performance (% 
people not expected to survive age 60; ecological footprint, quintile ratio (share of 
income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%), civil liberty violations, CO2 
emissions per capita, political rights violations, and unemployment) being reversed. 
Thus all indicators now imply that a high numerical value is a good development 
performance. Although we presume all the indicators as to be known generally, we 
refer our readers to a brief summary of the Happy Planet Indicator, available from 
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/list.htm, and the Yale/Columbia environmental data 
series, available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/ , which might be perhaps not 
so well-known to the readers. The dependent variables were measured, if not specified 
otherwise, by around the middle of the first decade of the new Millennium. The list of 
the dependent variables, to be projected onto a combined and single final indicator, 
comprises: 
1.  Economic growth, 1990-2003 (UNDP HDR, 2005) 
2.  Eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use) (UNDP HDR 
2000) 
3.  Female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate (UNDP 
HDR 2000) 
4.  Freedom from % people not expected to survive age 60 (UNDP HDR 2000) 
5.  Freedom from a high ecological Footprint, 2004 (Happy Planet Organization) 
6.  Freedom from a high quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% 
to poorest 20%) (UNDP HDR 2005) 
7.  Freedom from civil liberty violations, 1998, and 2006 (Easterly, 2000, and 
Freedom House, 2007) 
8.  Freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita (UNDP HDR 2000) 
9.  Freedom from political rights violations, 1998, and 2006 (Easterly, 2000, and 
Freedom House, 2007) 
10. Freedom from unemployment, 2003 (UN statistical system website, social 
indicators) 13 
 
11. Gender development index (GDI) 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
12. Gender empowerment index (GEM), 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
13. Happy Planet Index (HPI), 2004 (Happy Planet Organization) 
14. Human development Index (HDI), 2005 (UNDP HDR 2005) 
15. life expectancy, 1995-2000 (UNDP HDR 2000) 
16. Life Satisfaction, 2004 (Happy Planet Organization) 
17. The Yale/Columbia
14 environmental sustainability index (ESI-Index), 2005 
The list of our dependent variables is thus again multidimensional: 
1.  Democracy and human rights 
Absence of democracy: political rights and civil rights violations (based 
on Freedom House, 2000, reported in Easterly, 2000 and Freedom 
House, 2007) 
2.  Environment 
CO2 emissions per capita 
ESI-Index ((Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project 
website) 
GDP output per kg energy use (“eco-social market economy”) 
Ecological Footprint 
Happy Planet Index 
3.  Human development and basic human needs satisfaction 
% people not expected to survive age 60 
Human development index 
Life expectancy, 1995-2000 
Life Satisfaction20 
4.  Gender justice 
Gender development index 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
Gender empowerment index, 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
Female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
(UNDP HDR 2000) 
5.  Redistribution, growth and employment policies 
Economic growth 1990-2003 
Share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
Unemployment 2003 (from United Nations statistical website) 
In Graph 2, we summarize our vision of the “global Lisbon process” from what is 
known from the international indicators. The dimension of human rights and gender 
equality is conspicuously absent from the original Eurostat Lisbon 
14 list. Our list, by 
contrast, integrates the five dimensions: growth, environment, human rights, basic 
human needs, and gender equality. 
Insert Graph 2 Global Lisbon process about here 
                                             




4. A composite dimension index 
The Global Lisbon Process (GLP), combining the development performance of all the 
variables, mentioned in Graph 2 is corresponding to the following equation: 
(1)   i ji j i i i X X X GLP ε β β β α + + + + + = ..... 2 2 1 1  
where α is the intercept, β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, ε is an 
error term, and X a vector of j indicator of progress for country i. The vector X include: 
first part curvilinear function of development level, second part curvilinear function of 
development level, stock of transnational investment per GDP, comparative price 
levels, foreign saving, dummy for transition economy, percentage of the population 
adhering to the Muslim faith, European Union membership, state interventionism, 
urbanisation, dummy for landlocked country, and the dummy for World Bank pension 
reform. 
The “Lisbon process” for us is constituted in the following way. To evaluate the global 
Lisbon process indicators at once, we constructed a UNDP-type index from the data. 
This type of index is to identify indicators with linear relationship and create a 
composite index that helps to rank individual countries using a single index. The 
methodology is used to compute a number of composite indicators that are used to form 
the Global Lisbon Process.   
Here, the Global Lisbon Process is composed of 17 major components labeled as 
dimensions. These dimensions are listed and explained below. Each dimension 
components is generated from a number of indicators. This type of index was initially 
introduced to compute the UNDP “Human Development Index” (HDI). It has also been 
used in computation of a “Globalization Index” (Heshmati, 2006), “Lisbon 
Development Strategy-Index” (Heshmati and Oh, 2006), and “Child Well-being-Index” 
(Heshmati, Tausch and Bajalan (2008). This index can serve as a model for 
computation of a GLP. The GLP index can alternatively be estimated parametrically 
using Principal Component Analysis (see e.g. Heshmati, 2006; Andersen and 
Herbertsson, 2003; Tausch and Heshmati, 2005).
15. The non-parametric approach has 
the advantages that it does not require a functional form to be assumed. The GLP index 
is computed based on the normalization of the 17 individual dimensions and the 
subsequent aggregation using a weighting system as follows: 






jm jm jm jmi jm i X X X X GLP
11
min max min } ) /( ) {( ω  
where i indicate country, m and j are within and between dimension subscripts,  jm ω  are 
the within dimension and between dimension weights attached to each indicator (X), 
min and max are minimum and maximum values of respective indicator across 
countries.  
                                             
15 For recent surveys on the literature on the use of composite indices in different development research 
context see also Archibugi and Coco (2004) and Grupp and Mogee (2004). 15 
 
The index in (2) is suitable for indicators with an expected positive effect on 
development. In cases where the indicators are expected to have a negative impact on 
development the corresponding index is written as: 






jm jm jmi jm jm i X X X X GLP
11
min max max } ) /( ) {( ω  
where the two indices differ only by the nominator of the ratio. Alternatively, prior to 
the normalization in (2) the negative indicators are transformed to inverses, (1/X) 
reversing their expected impact from negative to positive.  
The component’s weights in equations (2) and (3) are chosen on an ad hoc basis and 
are constant across countries. This GLP index can be used as a benchmark index, and 
as in the computation of the “globalization index” (Heshmati, 2006), finds the ranking 
of countries to be sensitive to the way the indicators are measured, normalized and 
weighted. The weighting approach here is similar to the commonly used HDI, which is 
based on educational attainment, life expectancy and real GDP per capita (see 
Noorbakhsh, 1998; Kang, 2002; Katz 2006; and Lockwood, 2004), where all indicators 
are given equal weight.  
In our case, with the exception of few indicators which are already normalized indices, 
we calculated the 17 different dimension normalized indices for the global Lisbon 
process, using the formula 2 and 3. Due to missing values, we were satisfied with 
simply calculating the means from the 17 available different components: 
GLI = the means from the following component index for the dimension: 
1. Economic growth 
2. Eco-social market economy 
3. Female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
4. Freedom from % people not expected to survive age 60 
5. Freedom from a high ecological Footprint 
6. Freedom from a high quintile ratio 
7. Freedom from civil liberty violations 
8. Freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita 
9. Freedom from political rights violations 
10. Freedom from unemployment 
11. Gender development index 
12. Gender empowerment index 
13. Happy Planet Index 
14. Human development Index 
15. Life expectancy 
16. Life Satisfaction 
17. Yale/Columbia environmental sustainability index 
Needless to say, Graph 3 shows that the global Lisbon indicator and the UNDP Human 
Development Indicator are closely and positively interrelated.  




5. The results 
First, we present our results on a global scale. The regression results from the 18 
models including the estimated coefficients, their standardized errors, weights, t-tests 
and error probabilities to measure the effects of the 12 predictor variables on the 
dependent variables, each measuring a positive development performance, is 
summarized in Table 1.
16 It should be emphasized again, that all indicators were 
standardized, and that a high numerical value for each indicator implies a “good” 
development performance. 
Insert Table 1 Determinants of development performance about here 
The causal links for the global Lisbon performance can be further specified in Graph 4. 
It portrays the determinants of the global Lisbon Process Indicator. The full arrows 
indicate positive influence of the predictor on the global Lisbon process, while the 
doted arrows negative influence on the process. 
Insert Graph 4 Final causal model about here 
The summarizing Table 2 finally shows the rankings of the highly developed countries 
in the global Lisbon process. European decision makers would be well advised to re-
think their strategies, indeed. Not the United States (rank on the global Lisbon scale – 
38) should be the target country, but the European welfare democracies Switzerland, 
Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Ireland, who all 
maximized the Lisbon process, combining its 17 different components. 
Insert Table 2 Global Lisbon Process about here 
Pushing Europe downwards the path of a passive reliance on multinational corporation 
penetration will only increase the growth impediments of the growingly multicultural 
Europe.  
Secondly, our general approach receives a qualified support by our study about 
economic growth in the European regions. In Map 4, we report the transnational 
corporations’ foreign direct investment intensity in Europe. 
Insert Map 4 Transnational corporation investment about here 
Our final regional development equations reported in Table 3 show that regional 
convergence in Europe is significantly blocked by MNC penetration, this time 
measured by the weight which MNCs exert over total employment.  
Insert Table 3 Determinants of economic growth about here 
Some of the beta-weights for the control variable “development level” and its square in 
the multiple regressions are above 1.0, due to the high collinearity of this variable. 
 
6. Discussion 
It would be virtually impossible for reasons of space to compare the results of this 
study one by one with earlier results published in the wide and ever more expanding 
research literature on MNC penetration and socio-economic development. A 
                                             
16 Only statistically significant preditors coefficients are reported here. 17 
 
scientometric analysis of the vast dependency-oriented research literature in the major 
international social science journals revealed that as of July 4
th, 2009, 328 major 
international studies quoted the path-breaking Galtung analysis (1971), and a further 74 
major international studies were based on the Sunkel essay (1973), which both must be 
regarded as the catalyst essays for the two follow-up pioneering quantitative 
dependency studies, authored by Chase-Dunn (1975) [which had in turn 213 follow-up 
studies], and Rubinson (1976) [which yielded 170 follow-up studies]. Bornschier, 
Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson (1978), which then built on the essays by Chase-Dunn 
(1975) and Rubinson (1978), were the first to study introducing the concept of MNC 
penetration as major operationalizations of dependency theory. This essay initiated 185 
follow-up studies, all published in the major global peer reviewed social science 
journals, and the later essay, Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, devoted to the issue of economic 
inequality as a consequence of MNC penetration, 74 studies
17. Later tests of the 
Bornschier hypotheses could nothing but support and refine the original argument, 
independently from the research design (see inter alia Beer, 1999; Kentor, 1998; 
Tausch and Prager, 1993, just to mention a few). 
It is important to emphasize as well that the independent dependency theory variables 
under scrutiny here must not be confounded with the Kearney-Index oriented research 
results on globalization; for our present independent variables measure the dependent 
insertion of countries into the world economy, while the Kearney index has much to do 
with openness, connectivity, and also infrastructure (see Kearney A. T. 2002; 2003; 
furthermore Addison and Heshmati, 2003; Heshmati, 2006, 2007; Heshmati and 
Tausch, 2007). The Kearney Index measures, besides the dimension of foreign direct 
investment, government transfers; Gross Domestic Product; international organization 
membership; international travel; internet hosts; internet users; peacekeeping missions; 
population; remittances and personal transfers; secure Internet servers; telephone 
traffic; trade; and treaties. Not surprisingly, in 2007 the ten most globalized countries 
according to the Kearney methodology were Singapore, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Ireland, followed by Denmark, the United States, Canada, Jordan and 
Estonia.
18 The typical peripheries and semi-peripheries of the world system are 
generally ranked very low on the Kearney index.  
By and large, our present research results support the original dependency theory 
arguments, reported in Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson (1978), and 
Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, which were based on analyses of the then “B-phase” in the 
waning Kondratiev cycle from 1960 to the mid 1970s, for the current period in the 
world economy. The fact that some research results, reported in the literature, do not 
exactly correspond to other research results, must be qualified in the light of the 
following phenomena: 
•  The time frame of the study in the 50 to 60 year long wave economic 
Kondratiev cycle, 
•  The sample composition of the study, and 
•  The influence of other predictors, like development level, urbanization rate etc. 
                                             




Arguments in the literature, which stress that cycle time plays an important role in the 
logic of development, can be found, among alia, in Bobróvnikov (2004), Bornschier 
(1996), and Tausch and Herrmann (2001). Our cross-national SPSS XV results support 
dependency thinking, but they do refine the analysis in important ways. Foreign 
savings, in a neo-Keynesian fashion, can be an important asset in the development 
process and contribute significantly and positively towards the positive performance of 
countries on the following performance index indicators, in many ways alleviating the 
social tensions, which arise out of a savings process, based on internal savings: Global 
Lisbon Index; political rights; civil liberty, freedom from a high percentage of people 
not expected to survive age 60; life expectancy; freedom from high CO2 emissions per 
capita; the Gender Development Index GDI; and the Human Development Index, HDI. 
However, the performance of foreign savings for the employment performance of a 
country is significantly negative, reflecting the partial correctness of the many 
reservations, which dependency authors like Paul Israel Singer had against a too high 
reliance on foreign savings.  
The next indicator on our list of dependency-oriented research variables is low 
comparative international price levels. As it is well-known from the literature, 
especially Pan Yotopoulos (2005) has shown in his works what he perceives as the 
negative effects of low comparative price levels; while the mainstream of pro-globalist 
economists would regard them, just as foreign savings and multinational corporation 
penetration, as a positive development asset. However, our empirical evidence reveals 
that these low comparative price levels, as correctly predicted by Yotopoulos, 
negatively affect the environmental balance of poorer countries. The argument made by 
Yotopoulos and Sawada (2005) is worthwhile remembering here: currency substitution 
represents an asymmetric demand from Mexicans to hold dollars as a store of value, a 
demand that is not reciprocated by Americans holding pesos as a hedge against the 
devaluation of the dollar. Yotopoulos and Sawada go on to say: 
“In free currency markets hard currencies fluctuate, while soft currencies depreciate 
systematically (...) The alternative scenario deprives devaluation of any of its remedial 
properties that in the conventional view lead to a process of stable interactions and 
equilibrium […] Mexico cannot service its foreign debt from the proceeds of producing 
non-tradables. These are traded in pesos. It has instead to shift resources away from 
the non-tradable sector to produce tradable output in order to procure the dollars for 
servicing the debt (...) The process (...) can create a negative feedback loop that leads 
to resource misallocation in soft-currency countries (...) This shift of resources 
represents misallocation and produces inefficiency and output losses (...) Distortions 
inherent in free currency markets lead to a systematic devaluation of soft currencies – 
to “high“ nominal exchange rates. Devaluation of the exchange rate means increasing 
prices of tradables and leads to increased exports. But not all exports are a bargain to 
produce compared to the alternative of producing non-tradables (...) Countries 
graduate from being exporters of sugar and copra to exporting their teak forests, and 
on to systematically exporting nurses and doctors, while they remain underdeveloped 
all the same. If this happens, it may represent competitive devaluation trade as opposed 
to comparative advantage trade.”  
The often-hailed beneficial effects of foreign capital penetration do not materialize at 
all, thus re-iterating a consensus of the almost 200 studies, now having been published 
globally on the original Bornschier research findings from the late 1970s and early 19 
 
1980s. There are no positive effects on our 18 indicators (17 components and 1 final 
combined indicator) of development, and as correctly predicted by the dependency 
literature in the tradition of Volker Bornschier, Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and 
Richard Rubinson, social polarization dramatically increases by a development model, 
based on a very high foreign capital penetration. The significant negative effects on the 
development performance in our study are: civil liberty; eco-social market economy; 
freedom from CO2 emissions per capita; political rights, employment; and the Global 
Lisbon Index. 
Globalization critics often portrayed World Bank pension reforms in many countries 
around the globe as the ultimate triumph of global capitalism and the apotheosis of 
financial capital (for a critique of the current debate, see Tausch, 2007). However, our 
analysis shows that such dire predictions are not true and that the eco-social balance of 
the economy is positively and significantly affected by such reforms, most probably 
because such pension reforms usually go hand in hand with very profound and 
reformist changes in the overall price mechanism.  
Our analysis also sheds new light on the often-contested dimensions of culture, 
geography, and development history in the broadest sense. Let us start with the 
empirical test of the stream of literature, influenced by Samuel Huntington (1996) and 
his hypothesis that Islam is absolutely incompatible with the development of a modern, 
democratic society and economy. Our results suggest that Muslim culture has by 
contrast even the following positive and significant effects on the development 
performance, as measured by the following performance index indicators: freedom 
from a high quintile ratio; and freedom from a high percentage of people not expected 
to survive age 60. 
Thus, it can be shown that income redistribution and basic human needs – ceteris 
paribus – are positively influenced especially by the manifold Muslim welfare 
foundations, which positively affect the outcomes on this dimension. But Muslim 
societies, however, suffer – again ceteris paribus – from deficits along the three-fold 
front of “new social problems” – the environment, gender, and human rights, as 
partially and correctly already predicted by the writings of Inglehart (2007) and his 
school: the Global Lisbon Index; the ESI-Index; female economic activity rates as % of 
male economic activity rates; civil liberty; political rights; and the Gender 
Empowerment Index (GEM) are the “Achilles heels” of the “real existing Muslim 
societies” today. This is far away from the dire generalist predictions, offered by 
Huntington, and an invitation to global Islam to develop positions on the environment, 
gender and human rights. 
Long-term European Union membership, according to our analysis, has the following 
positive effects on development and no significant negative effects, showing that the 
European Union – especially its old center of 15 countries – can correctly claim global 
leadership in the environmental protection process: freedom from CO2 emissions per 
capita; and the eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use).  
Now let us move towards the dimension of economic policy. Neoliberals are right in 
maintaining that economic freedom is a sound and robust requirement to achieve 
several dimensions of development, and that state interventions negatively and 
significantly affect the following performances: economic growth, 1990-2003; the 
Global Lisbon Index; political rights; and civil liberty are all negatively influenced by 20 
 
state interventions. Interestingly enough, and ceteris paribus – there are no negative 
effects of economic freedom.  
Now let us move towards the dimension of development history. This often puzzling 
question can now be answered in the following sense. Modernization – i.e. rising 
income levels (ln GDP per capita) have the strong expected following positive effects 
on the development performance in the following dimensions: HPI Happy Planet 
Index; freedom from CO2 emissions per capita; freedom from a high EF, ecological 
footprint; freedom from a high percentage of people not expected to survive age 60; life 
expectancy, 1995-2000; and the HDI 2005. 
Economic maturity, or if you wish and prefer, modernity, i.e. [ln (GDP/capita)]
2, is 
good for the following performances, measured by the following performance 
indicators, as defined in this study: female economic activity rates as a percentage of 
male economic activity rates; the Gender Empowerment Measure, GEM; freedom from 
a high quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%); and 
the eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use). 
Now let us move towards the darker sides of the process of development. 
Modernization – i.e. rising income levels (ln GDP/capita) have the strong negative 
effects on the development performance in the following dimensions, quite in line with 
an extended Kuznets (1940 and 1955) function of inequality, especially negatively 
affecting the gender balance of society. Women are the first and main losers of any 
modernization process, and modernization negatively affects the freedom from a high 
quintile ratio (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%); the GEM 
2006; and female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate. 
Economic maturity, [ln (GDP/capita)]
2, is bad for the ecological and sustainable 
development performance, measured by the following indicators, especially showing 
the severe contradictions and cracks in the fabric of very advanced societies: life 
expectancy; freedom from a high percentage of people not expected to survive age 60; 
freedom from EF, ecological footprint; freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita; 
and HPI, the Happy Planet Index. 
One of the dire consequences of our empirical analysis is also the fact, that not only 
modernization and modernity have their contradictions, but also the process of 
urbanization. Culturalist discourse in many Western countries often blames Islam for 
these phenomena, which in reality arise out of the combination of 
modernization/modernity and urbanization. Urbanization has no positive and the 
following negative significant consequences for: political rights; civil liberty; freedom 
from high CO2 emissions per capita; the Global Lisbon Index; female economic 
activity rates as % of male economic activity rates; and economic growth, 1990-2003. 
Thus, summing up on these tendencies, all predicted by the pessimistic variants of 
“modernization sociology” in the 1960s, would be to state that our analysis vindicates 
the very pessimistic modernization analysis by Huntington in 1968 – against the 
Huntington analysis of Islam, which Huntington published in 1996. 
The transition from state socialism to capitalism has the following positive significant 
trade-offs to the positive development performance on these indicators. These positive 
trade-offs are still to be regarded as a legacy of former Communist times and their tight 
net of social security in the framework of a totalitarian or semi-totalitarian dictatorship: 21 
 
female economic activity rates as % of male economic activity rates; freedom from 
high quintile ratios (share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%); the 
GDI 2006; the HDI 2005; life expectancy, 1995-2000; and the freedom from a high 
percentage of people not expected to survive age 60. 
The negative significant trade-offs of transition to development performance are in the 
following areas, reflecting the dire consequences of state socialism for the environment 
and for people’s overall happiness: freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita; 
freedom from EF, ecological footprint; the HPI Happy Planet Index; and the eco-social 
market economy (GDP output per kg energy use). 
Last, but not least, we should mention the significant negative effects of what certainly 
cannot be changed by deliberate rational policy – the status of a country as a landlocked 
nation. Landlocked countries dismally perform on the following development 
indicators: the HDI; life expectancy; the GDI; freedom from a high percentage of 
people not expected to survive age 60; the Global Lisbon Index; political rights; and 
economic growth, 1990-2003. 
The results from our regional growth analysis for the EU-27 by and large also support 
the early findings of dependency-oriented cross-national development research. At the 
5% significance level, MNC employment dependence significantly blocks economic 
growth, is detrimental to unemployment reduction, and finally significantly and 
negatively affects the regional Lisbon performance.  
 
7. Perspectives and conclusions 
A thorough re-thinking of basic premises of policy-making in Europe is thus necessary. 
The Swedish EU-Presidency in its non-paper on the post-2010 Lisbon strategy 
proposed that the EU and the Member States should focus on and deliver in the 
following areas in 2010–2020: 
•  Promoting external and internal openness, sound competition and a well-
functioning single market. 
•  Ensuring macroeconomic stability and sustainable public finances. 
•  Making full use of the labor supply potential and fulfilling the target of full 
employment, while strengthening social cohesion. 
•  Promoting investment in human capital and research. 
•  Creating an eco-efficient business society and improving the innovation and 
business climate. 
•  Developing a sustainable energy supply and curbing climate impact 
Our analysis, by contrast, showed that the ultra-liberal strategy of opening markets is 
not the solution, but very much part of the problem of the European malaise. Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso was absolutely right in predicting the following processes to happen: 
•  There is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist 
centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery, 
•  This produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral 
societies and between them and the centers, 
•  This leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery, 22 
 
•  This favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations, and 
•  These require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the 
functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which 
contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance 
(Cardoso, 1979). 
Instead of concentrating on Maastricht and its austerity program, foreign savings, in a 
neo-Keynesian fashion, can be an important asset in the development process and 
contribute significantly and positively towards the positive performance of countries on 
several key performance indicators: the Global Lisbon Index; political rights, civil 
liberties, survival at age 60, life expectancy; CO2 emissions reduction, the gender 
development index and the human development index. 
Lowering comparative international price levels, part and parcel of the 14 main 
structural EU-Commission Lisbon indicators, negatively affects the environmental 
balance of poorer countries. 
Also, the often-hailed beneficial effects of foreign capital penetration do not 
materialize. There are no positive effects on our 18 indicators (17 components and 1 
final combined indicator) of development, and as correctly predicted by the 
dependency literature in the tradition of Osvaldo Sunkel, social polarization 
dramatically increases by a development model, based on a very high foreign capital 
penetration.  
Our results also suggest that migration pessimism in Europe is baseless and that 
Muslim culture has several good and significant effects on the development 
performance, as measured by improving income distribution and survival. Muslim 
societies, however, suffer from deficits along the “new social problems” – the 
environment, gender, and human rights. 
The European Union can, according to our analysis, correctly claim global leadership 
in the environmental protection process, as measured by the performances on the CO2 
emissions per capita reduction indicator; and the eco-social market economy (GDP 
output per kg energy use). This “comparative advantage” of the European Union 
however is threatened in our opinion by the policies of unfettered and dependent 
insertion into the structures of the world economy, as recently emphasized as well by 
the studies Brand (2005), Brand and Goerg (2003) and Brand et al. (2008). 
There are some historical considerations that must be taken into account as well, which 
strongly speak in favor of our quantitative analysis, presented in this essay. Europe is 
not engaged in the first Lisbon race of its kind to catch up with America. Much of the 
19
th Century and the first half of the 20
th Century witnessed a European decline vis-à-
vis the US, and only the post-war period after 1945 saw a relative closing of the gap, 
that began to widen again after 1973. 
Andre Gunder Frank has implied for a long time that Europe’s quest has to be seen in 
the larger perspective of Asia’s re-ascent in the world system. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLAC/CEPAL, in its path-breaking essay 
“Globalización y desarrollo” (2002)
19 provided estimates that dramatically support 




such a view that stresses the simultaneousness of the ascent of Asia from the 1950s 
onwards with the decline of Europe after 1973 in the world system (Table 4). 
Insert Table 4 Gaps between Europe and USA about here 
Usually, world systems theories maintain that the present ongoing era of globalization 
already has its parallel in the 19
th Century. The UN CEPAL/ECLAC data neatly 
demonstrate that these epochs of globalization in the 19
th Century and after 1973 
shifted incomes relatively away from Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Japan and in 
favor of the United States and the “dominions”, while the era of regulation after 1945 
(Arrighi, 1995) clearly re-allocated relative incomes to the West Europeans, to the East 
Europeans and the Japanese. Latin America also gained during the era of import 
substitution from around 1930 to around 1973.  
If the explanation of the European malaise (high unemployment, low growth) by the 
neo-liberal school were right (over-regulation causing the crisis) then there is no way to 
explain how in a period of still larger European regulation during the 1950s, 1960s and 
early 1970s European growth was higher and European unemployment was lower than 
in the United States, which always was less regulated than the EU! With more and 
more deregulation, the gap between Europe and America does not close! 
One further important consequence of this analysis is the re-discovery of the issue of 
European industrial policy in the framework of an otherwise relatively free economy, 
which determines in the end the coefficients of MNC penetration. Thus the old critical 
questions addressed in the direction of neo-classical theory by such economists as 
Celso Furtado, Michal Kalecki, Gunnar Myrdal, Francois Perroux, Raul Prebisch, Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Kurt Rothschild, Dudley Seers, Hans Singer and others can be taken 
up anew. De-regulation helps, but it helps the dominant center to maintain and even 
increase its leading position, and certainly not the technologically and politically 
weaker nations of the periphery and semi-periphery. So, it is French former EU-
Commission President Jacques Delors (1992) and not economics Nobel laureate 
Professor Krugman, who seems to have gained the upper hand in the debate started by 
Professor Paul Krugman in “Foreign Affairs” in 1994, when he said about Delors and 
his plans for a European industrial policy: 
“In June 1993, Jacques Delors made a special presentation to the leaders of the 
nations of the European Community, meeting in Copenhagen, on the growing problem 
of European unemployment. Economists who study the European situation were 
curious to see what Delors, president of the EC Commission, would say. Most of them 
share more or less the same diagnosis of the European problem: the taxes and 
regulations imposed by Europe's elaborate welfare states have made employers 
reluctant to create new jobs, while the relatively generous level of unemployment 
benefits has made workers unwilling to accept the kinds of low-wage jobs that help 
keep unemployment comparatively low in the United States. The monetary difficulties 
associated with preserving the European Monetary System in the face of the costs of 
German reunification have reinforced this structural problem. 
It is a persuasive diagnosis, but a politically explosive one, and everyone wanted to see 
how Delors would handle it. Would he dare tell European leaders that their efforts to 
pursue economic justice have produced unemployment as an unintended by-product? 
Would he admit that the EMS could be sustained only at the cost of a recession and 24 
 
face the implications of that admission for European monetary union? 
Guess what? Delors didn't confront the problems of either the welfare state or the 
EMS. He explained that the root cause of European unemployment was a lack of 
competitiveness with the United States and Japan and that the solution was a program 
of investment in infrastructure and high technology. 
It was a disappointing evasion, but not a surprising one. After all, the rhetoric of 
competitiveness, the view that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is "like a 
big corporation competing in the global marketplace", has become pervasive among 
opinion leaders throughout the world. People who believe themselves to be 
sophisticated about the subject take it for granted that the economic problem facing 
any modern nation is essentially one of competing on world markets, that the United 
States and Japan are competitors in the same sense that Coca-Cola competes with 
Pepsi, and are unaware that anyone might seriously question that proposition. Every 
few months a new best-seller warns the American public of the dire consequences of 
losing the "race" for the 21st century. A whole industry of councils on competitiveness, 
"geo-economists" and managed trade theorists has sprung up in Washington. Many of 
these people, having diagnosed America's economic problems in much the same terms 
as Delors did Europe's, are now in the highest reaches of the Clinton administration 
formulating economic and trade policy for the United States. So Delors was using a 
language that was not only convenient but comfortable for him and a wide audience on 
both sides of the Atlantic.” (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19940301faessay5094/paul-
krugman/competitiveness-a-dangerous-obsession.html) 
But our results exactly open up, as we stated above, the box of industrial policy. Has 
Europe such a policy at all, or is European wisdom reduced to the magic number of 3% 
budget deficit, i.e. the Maastricht criteria? In our opinion, European policy-making 
finally should dare to take the globalization-critical organizations of “civil society” 
seriously (Brand, 2005; Brand and Raza, 2003; Brand et al., 2000; Brand et al., 2001). 
According to our analysis, industrial policy is the sine qua of a real European answer to 
United States Keynesian global power strategy that always put the well-being of the US 
transnational corporation ahead of ideology. 25 
 
Literature 
Addison T. and Heshmati A. (2004), The new global determinants of FDI to 
developing countries, Research in Banking and Finance 4, 151-186. 
Altman M. and McDonald M. P. (2001), Choosing Reliable Statistical Software. PS: 
Political Science & Politics, Volume 34 (3), Sep 2001: 681-687. 
Amin S. (1976), ‘Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of 
Peripheral Capitalism’ New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Andersen T. M. and T. T. Herbertsson (2003), ‘Measuring Globalization’. IZA 
Discussion Paper. 2003: 817. Bonn: IZA.  
Archibugi D. and A. Coco (2004), A New Indicator of Technological Capabilities for 
Developed and Developing Countries (ArCo), World Development 32(4), 629-654. 
Arrighi G. (1995), ‘The Long 20th Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our 
Times’ London, New York: Verso. 
Barro R. J. (2003), Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. International 
Library of Critical Writings in Economics, 159(1), 350-386. 
Batou J. and Szlajfer H. (Ed.) (2009), ‘Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and world 
development, 13th-18th centuries: collection of essays of Marian Małowist’ 
Leiden; Boston: Brill. 
Beer L. (1999), Income Inequality and Transnational Corporate Penetration. Journal of 
World Systems Research, 5(1), 1 – 25. 
Bernhard M. and Szlajfer H. (1995), ‘From the Polish underground: selections from 
Krytyka, 1978-1993’. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University. 
Bobróvnikov A. V. (2004), ‘Makrocikly v ekonomike stran Latinskoj Ameriki’. 
[Macorcycles in the economies of Latin American countries]. Moskva: Inst. 
Latinskoj Ameriki 
Bornschier (1976), ‘Wachstum, Konzentration und Multinationalisierung von 
Industrieunternehmen’. Frauenfeld; Stuttgart: Huber. 
Bornschier V. (1980), ‚Multinationale Konzerne, Wirtschaftspolitik und nationale 
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Map 2.A MNC penetration in the world system, 1995 
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Map 2.C Increase of MNC penetration in the world system, 1995-2005 
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Map 3.A Foreign saving in the world system 
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by around 2000
13 to 92  (32)
8 to 13  (32)
3 to  8  (30)
0 to  3  (26)





Map 3.B Foreign saving in the world system, Close-up for Europe 
as % of GDP
by around 2000
13 to 92  (32)
8 to 13  (32)
3 to  8  (30)
0 to  3  (26)






Map 4: Transnational Corporation’s investment in Europe 
 
Source: European Commission (2007). Very dark colors: more than 13.19% MNC employment, very 
light colors: less than 1.07% MNC employment. 
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Source: our own compilations from Eurostat, freely available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/structural_indicators/indicators/short_list.  
 



















Graph 3: The Global Lisbon Process and its relationship with other important, 
combined international indicators 
UNDP HDI and Global Lisbon Process Index
































































Table 1: The determinants of development performance (error p <0.05) 
The significant effects of dependency  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
1. foreign savings  (I-S)/GNP (I-S)/GNP 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Political rights violations,1998  0.269  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Civil liberty violation, 1998  0.179  0.006 
Global Lisbon Index  0.134 0.023 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:% people not expected to survive age 60  0.132  0.022 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: life expectancy, 1995-2000  0.129  0.013 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  0.121  0.046 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:GDI 2006  0.075  0.039 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HDI 2005  0.067  0.040 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: unemployment  -0.371  0.003 
The significant effects of dependency  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
2. Low comparative price levels (unequal exchange)  low comp. intl price level (ERD)  low comp. intl price level (ERD) 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)  -0.214  0.027 
The significant effects of dependency  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
3. The long-term structural effects of transnational corporation penetration  MNC PEN 1995  MNC PEN 1995 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Civil liberty violation, 1998  -0.117  0.047 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)  -0.126  0.045 
Global Lisbon Index  -0.163 0.003 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  -0.168  0.002 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Political rights violations,1998  -0.184  0.003 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: unemployment  -0.271  0.015 
The significant effects of the "Huntington factor"  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
4. The effects of the Muslim population share on global development  Muslims as % of total population  Muslims as % of total population 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: quintile ratio (share of inc./cons richest 20% to poorest 20%)  0.216  0.033 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:% people not expected to survive age 60  0.147  0.006 
Global Lisbon Index  -0.122 0.024 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:ESI-Index  -0.209  0.012 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: female economic activity rate as % of males activity rate  -0.255  0.001 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Civil liberty violation, 1998  -0.285  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Political rights violations,1998  -0.326  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:GEM 2006  -0.421  0.000 41 
 
The significant effects of institutions  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
5. EU-membership (EU-15)  EU-membership (EU-15)  EU-membership (EU-15) 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  0.154  0.014 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)  0.154  0.033 
The significant effects of state intervention  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
6. Absence of Economic Freedom, based on the Heritage Foundation Score  state interv.(absence of eco. freedom) state interv.(absence of eco. freedom)
PERFORMANCE INDEX: economic growth, 1990-2003  -0.332  0.015 
Global Lisbon Index  -0.350 0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Political rights violations,1998  -0.461  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Civil liberty violation, 1998  -0.503  0.000 
The significant effects of geography  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
7. Landlocked status  landlocked landlocked 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HDI 2005  -0.083  0.011 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: life expectancy, 1995-2000  -0.105  0.039 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:GDI 2006  -0.109  0.003 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:% people not expected to survive age 60  -0.132  0.020 
Global Lisbon Index  -0.155 0.008 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Political rights violations,1998  -0.172  0.009 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: economic growth, 1990-2003  -0.245  0.008 
The significant effects of the urbanization process  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
8. Urbanization ratio, time-lagged  Urbanization ratio. 1990  Urbanization ratio. 1990 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Political rights violations,1998  -0.247  0.024 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: Civil liberty violation, 1998  -0.257  0.016 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  -0.274  0.004 
Global Lisbon Index  -0.292 0.003 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: female economic activity rate as % of males activity rate  -0.358  0.006 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: economic growth, 1990-2003  -0.547  0.000 
The significant effects of the transition from state socialism to a market economy  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
9. Transition economy  transition economy  transition economy 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: female economic activity rate as % of males activity rate  0.506  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: quintile ratio (share of inc/cons richest 20% to poorest 20%)  0.367  0.002 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:GDI 2006  0.188  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HDI 2005  0.163  0.000 42 
 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: life expectancy, 1995-2000  0.130  0.019 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:% people not expected to survive age 60  0.121  0.049 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  -0.199  0.002 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:EF ecological footprint  -0.204  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HPI Happy Planet Index  -0.222  0.028 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)  -0.264  0.000 
The significant effects of the extended “Kuznets function”  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
10. Rising development level, [ln GDP per capita[  ln(GDP PPP pc)  ln(GDP PPP pc) 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HPI Happy Planet Index  6.091  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  5.254  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:EF ecological footprint  4.653  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:% people not expected to survive age 60  2.796  0.001 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: life expectancy, 1995-2000  2.557  0.001 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HDI 2005  1.779  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: quintile ratio (share of inc/cons richest 20% to poorest 20%)  -3.871  0.018 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:GEM 2006  -4.171  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: female economic activity rate as % of males activity rate  -7.227  0.000 
The significant effects of the extended “Kuznets function”  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
11. Economic maturity, [ln GDP per capita]^2  ln (GDP PPP pc)^2  ln (GDP PPP pc)^2 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: female economic activity rate as % of males activity rate  7.294  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:GEM 2006  4.717  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: quintile ratio (share of inc/cons richest 20% to poorest 20%)  4.303  0.011 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use)  2.174  0.037 
PERFORMANCE INDEX: life expectancy, 1995-2000  -1.829  0.024 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:% people not expected to survive age 60  -2.081  0.021 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:EF ecological footprint  -5.408  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:CO2 emissions per capita  -5.990  0.000 
PERFORMANCE INDEX:HPI Happy Planet Index  -6.083  0.000 
The significant effects World-Bank-inspired three-pillar pension reforms  beta coeff. for develop. efficiency  Error Probability 
12. World Bank pension reform  world bank pension reform  world bank pension reform 




Table 2: The global Lisbon race 
Country code  Global Lisbon Index  world rank  country group 
Switzerland 0.82715  1  EEA/EFTA 
Iceland 0.81502  2  EEA/EFTA 
Austria 0.81147  3  EU-27 
Sweden 0.80700  4  EU-27 
Norway 0.80098  5  EEA/EFTA 
Denmark 0.79661  6  EU-27 
Finland 0.77986  7  EU-27 
Netherlands 0.77260  8  EU-27 
Ireland 0.76347  9  EU-27 
Japan  0.76012  10  other OECD democracies 
Nada 0.75274  13  other  OECD  democracies 
Cyprus 0.75226  14  EU-27 
Germany 0.75064  15  EU-27 
Luxembourg 0.74795  16  EU-27 
Italy 0.74482  17  EU-27 
New Zealand  0.74296  18  other OECD democracies 
Slovenia 0.73988  19  EU-27 
France 0.73665  21  EU-27 
United Kingdom  0.73603  23  EU-27 
Belgium 0.73226  24  EU-27 
Spain 0.73157  25  EU-27 
Portugal 0.72986  26  EU-27 
Australia  0.72463  27  other OECD democracies 
Israel  0.69906  32  other OECD democracies 
Greece 0.68434  34  EU-27 
Hungary 0.68010  36  EU-27 
United States  0.67610  38  other OECD democracies 
Poland 0.66212  42  EU-27 
Slovakia 0.66206  43  EU-27 
Latvia 0.66192  44  EU-27 
Lithuania 0.65630  47  EU-27 
Croatia 0.64230  49  EU-candidate 
Romania 0.64060  51  EU-27 
Bulgaria 0.62485  60  EU-27 
Estonia 0.62176  63  EU-27 
Czech Republic  0.61236  69  EU-27 
Turkey 0.56760  80  EU-candidate 
 
 
   44











of the aged 
error prob: 
employment 
of the aged 













% population under < 15 years  0.128  0.045  0.096  0.150  0.119  0.044  0.097  0.003 
% population aged 15 – 64  0.240  0.001  -0.154  0.038  -0.089  0.173  -0.155  0.000 
%  agricultural  employment 0.005  0.947 0.299 0.001  0.052  0.488  0.226  0.000 
% adult pop. with higher 
education 
0.443  0.000 0.441 0.000  0.169  0.011  0.302  0.000 
% adult pop. with medium 
education 
-0.079 0.262  -0.001  0.989  -0.135  0.038  0.182  0.000 
FDI Intensity  -0.383  0.000  -0.148  0.052  -0.294  0.000  -0.207  0.000 
GDP/head in PPS (Index, 
EU27=100), 2004 
-0.537 0.051 1.094 0.000  1.300  0.000  1.921  0.000 
GDP/head in PPS (Index, 
EU27=100), 2004^2 
0.449 0.060  -0.846  0.001 -0.724  0.001 -1.174  0.000 
% industrial employment  0.026  0.703 0.020 0.779  0.126  0.045  0.127  0.000 
Population density (in h./km²), 
2004 
-0.224 0.002  -0.031  0.669  -0.229  0.000  -0.103  0.004 
Population growth (average 
annual % change), 1995-2004 
0.281  0.000 0.018 0.828  0.171  0.018  0.083  0.037 
R&D expenditure (% of 
GDP), 2004 
-0.083 0.234 0.137 0.062  0.000  0.997  0.179  0.000 
Total population (1000 in h.), 
2004 
0.028 0.617  -0.137  0.021 -0.096  0.066 -0.060  0.037 
 
error p R
^2  n    F  
Regional economic growth rate  0.000  42.10  218  13.16 
Elder unemployment rate  0.000  36.40  218  10.55 
Unemployment rate  0.000  50.60  218  18.08 
Regional Lisbon process performance  0.000  85.10  218  95.97 
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Table 4: The evolution of the gap between Europe and the US since 1820 (real GDP per capita, United States = 100 for each year since 1820) 
GDP per capita in …  1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998 
Western Europe (in % of the US, AUS, NZ, CND)  102.60  81.20  66.10  49.50  71.30  71.50  68.50 
United  States,  Australia,  NZ,  CND  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Japan (in % of the US, AUS, NZ, CND)  55.70  30.30  26.40  20.70  70.70  84.00  78.10 
Asia (excl. Japan) (in % of the US, AUS, NZ,  CND)  47.90 26.50 12.20 6.80  7.60  9.50 11.20 
Latin Amer & Car. (in % of the US, AUS, NZ, CND)  55.40  28.70  28.70  27.50  28.00  22.60  22.20 
Eastern Europe + former USSR (in % of the US, AUS, NZ, CND)  55.50  37.70  28.60  28.00  35.40  28.80  16.70 
Africa (in % of the US, AUS, NZ, CND)  34.80 18.30 11.10  9.20  8.40  6.20  5.20 
Source: our own calculations from CEPAL/ECLAC 
 
  